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Abstract
Various studies have empirically shown that the majority of Java and Android apps misuse
cryptographic libraries, causing devastating breaches of data security. It is crucial to detect such
misuses early in the development process. To detect cryptography misuses, one must first define
secure uses, a process mastered primarily by cryptography experts, and not by developers.
In this paper, we present CrySL, a definition language for bridging the cognitive gap between
cryptography experts and developers. CrySL enables cryptography experts to specify the secure
usage of the cryptographic libraries that they provide. We have implemented a compiler that
translates such CrySL specification into a context-sensitive and flow-sensitive demand-driven
static analysis. The analysis then helps developers by automatically checking a given Java or
Android app for compliance with the CrySL-encoded rules.
We have designed an extensive CrySL rule set for the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA),
and empirically evaluated it by analyzing 10,000 current Android apps. Our results show that
misuse of cryptographic APIs is still widespread, with 95% of apps containing at least one misuse.
Our easily extensible CrySL rule set covers more violations than previous special-purpose tools
with hard-coded rules, with our tooling offering a more precise analysis.
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1 Introduction
Digital devices are increasingly storing sensitive data, which is often protected using cryp-
tography. However, developers must not only use secure cryptographic algorithms, but
also securely integrate such algorithms into their code. Unfortunately, prior studies suggest
that this is rarely the case. Lazar et al. [22] examined 269 published cryptography-related
vulnerabilities. They found that 223 are caused by developers misusing a security library
while only 46 result from faulty library implementations. Egele et al. [13] statically analyzed
11,748 Android apps using cryptography-related application interfaces (Crypto APIs) and
found 88% of them violated at least one basic cryptography rule. Chatzikonstantinou et
al. [12] reached a similar conclusion by analyzing apps manually and dynamically. In 2017,
VeraCode listed insecure uses of cryptography as the second-most prevalent application-
security issue right after information leakage [11]. Such pervasive insecure use of Crypto APIs
leads to devastating vulnerabilities such as data breaches in a large number of applications.
Rasthofer et al. [31] showed that virtually all smartphone apps that rely on cloud services
use hard-coded keys. A simple decompilation gives adversaries access to those keys and to
all data that these apps store in the cloud.
Nadi et al. [27] were the first to investigate why developers often struggle to use
Crypto APIs. The authors conducted four studies, two of which survey Java developers
familiar with the Java Crypto APIs. The majority of participants (65%) found their
respective Crypto APIs hard to use. When asked why, participants mentioned the API level
of abstraction, insufficient documentation without examples, and an API design that makes
it difficult to understand how to properly use the API. A potential long-term solution is
to redesign the APIs such that they provide an easy-to-use interface for developers that is
secure by default. However, it remains crucial to detect and fix the existing insecure API uses.
When asked about what would simplify their API usage, participants wished they had tools
that help them automatically detect misuses and suggest possible fixes [27]. Unfortunately,
approaches based solely on specification inference and anomaly detection [33] are not viable
for Crypto APIs, because – as elaborated above – most uses of Crypto APIs are insecure.
Previous work has tried to detect misuses of Crypto APIs through static analysis. While
this is a step in the right direction, existing approaches are insufficient for several reasons.
First, these approaches implement mostly lightweight syntactic checks, which yield fast
analysis times at the cost of exposing a high number of false negatives. Therefore, such
analyses fail to warn about many insecure (especially non-trivial) uses of cryptography. For
instance, applications using password-based encryption commonly do not clear passwords
from heap memory and instead rely on garbage collection to free the respective memory
space. Moreover, existing tools cannot easily be extended to cover those rules; instead they
have cryptography-specific usage rules hard coded. The Java Cryptography Architecture
(JCA), the primary cryptography API for Java applications [27], offers a plugin design that
enables different providers to offer different crypto implementations through the same API,
often imposing slightly different usage requirements on their clients. Hard-coded rules can
hardly possibly reflect this diversity.
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In this paper, we present CrySL, a definition language that enables cryptography experts
to specify the secure usage of their Crypto APIs in a lightweight special-purpose syntax. We
also present a CrySL compiler that parses and type-checks CrySL rules and translates them
into an efficient, yet precise flow-sensitive and context-sensitive static data-flow analysis. The
analysis automatically checks a given Java or Android app for compliance with the encoded
CrySL rules. CrySL was specifically designed for (and with the help of) cryptography
experts. Our approach goes beyond methods that are useful for general validation of API
usage (e.g., typestate analysis [3, 7, 28, 8] and data-flow checks [2, 5]) by enabling the
expression of domain-specific constraints related to cryptographic algorithms and their
parameters.
To evaluate CrySL, we built the most comprehensive rule set available for the JCA
classes and interfaces to date, and encoded it in CrySL. We then used the generated static
analysis CogniCryptsast to scan 10,000 Android apps. We have also modelled the existing
hard-coded rules by Egele et al. [13] in CrySL and compared the findings of the generated
static analysis (CogniCryptcl) to those of CogniCryptsast. Our more comprehensive rule
set reports 3× more violations, most of which are true warnings. With such comprehensive
rules, CogniCryptsast finds at least one misuse in 95% of the apps. CogniCryptsast is
also highly efficient: for more than 75% of the apps, the analysis finishes in under 3 minutes
per app, where most of the time is spent in Android-specific call graph construction.
In summary, this paper presents the following contributions:
We introduce CrySL, a definition language to specify correct usages of Crypto APIs.
We encode a comprehensive specification of correct usages of the JCA in CrySL.
We present a CrySL compiler that translates CrySL rules into a static analysis to find
violations in a given Java or Android app.
We empirically evaluate CogniCryptsast on 10,000 Android apps.
We have integrated CogniCryptsast into crypto assistant CogniCrypt [20] and
have open-sourced our implementation and artifacts on GitHub. CogniCryptsast is
available at https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/CryptoAnalysis. The latest version of
the CrySL rules for the JCA can be accessed at https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/
Crypto-API-Rules.
2 Related Work
Before we discuss the details of our approach, we contrast it with the following related lines
of work: approaches for specifying API (mis)uses, approaches for inferring API specifications,
and previous approaches for detecting misuses of security APIs. Our review of these
approaches shows that existing specification languages are not optimally suited for defining
misuses of Crypto APIs. Additionally, automated inference of correct uses of Crypto APIs is
hard to achieve, and existing tools for detecting misuses of Crypto APIs are limited mainly
because they have hard-coded rule sets, and support for the most part lightweight syntactic
analyses.
2.1 Languages for Specifying and Checking API Properties
There is a significant body of research on textual specification languages that ensure API
properties by means of static data-flow analysis. Tracematches [3] were designed to check
typestate properties defined by regular expressions over runtime objects. Bodden et al. [8, 10]
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as well as Naeem and Lhoták [28] present algorithms to (partially) evaluate state matches
prior to the program execution, using static analysis.
Martin et al. [24] present Program Query Language (PQL) that enables a developer to
specify patterns of event sequences that constitute potentially defective behaviour. A dynamic
analysis (i.e., tracematches optimized by a static pre-analysis) matches the patterns against
a given program run. A pattern may include a fix that is applied to each match by dynamic
instrumentation. PQL has been applied to detecting security-related vulnerabilities such as
memory leaks [24], SQL injection and cross-site scripting [23]. Compared to tracematches,
PQL captures a greater variety of pattern specifications, at the disadvantage of using only
flow-insensitive static optimizations. PQL serves as the main inspiration for the CrySL
syntax. Other languages that pursue similar goals include PTQL [16], PDL [26], and TS4J [9].
We investigated tracematches and PQL in detail, yet found them insufficiently equipped
for the task at hand. First, both systems follow a black-list approach by defining and finding
incorrect program behaviour. We initially followed this approach for crypto-usage mistakes
but quickly discovered that it would lead to long, repetitive, and convoluted misuse-definitions.
Consequently, CrySL defines desired behaviour, which in the case of Crypto APIs leads to
more compact specifications. Second, the above languages are general-purpose languages
for bug finding, which causes them to miss features essential to define secure usages of
Crypto APIs in particular. The strong focus of CrySL on cryptography allows us to cover a
greater portion of cryptography-related problems in CrySL compared to other languages,
while at the same time keeping CrySL relatively simple. Third, the CrySL compiler
generates state-of-the-art static analyses that were shown to have better performance and
precision than other approaches [36], lowering the threat of false warnings.
2.2 Inference/Mining of API-usage specifications
As an alternative to specifying API-usage properties manually, one can attempt to infer
them from existing program code. Robillard et al. [34] surveyed over 60 approaches to API
property inference. As this survey shows, however, all but two of the surveyed approaches
infer patterns from client code (i.e., from applications that use the API in question). When
it comes to Crypto APIs, however, past studies have shown that the majority of existing
usages of those APIs is, in fact, insecure [13, 12, 35]. Another idea that appears sensible at
first sight is to infer correct usage of Crypto APIs from posts on developer portals such as
StackOverflow. However, recent studies show that the “solutions” posted there often include
insecure code [1].
In result, one can only conclude that automated mining of API-usage specifications is
very challenging for Crypto APIs, if it is possible at all. In the future, we plan to investigate
a semi-automated approach in which we use automated inference to infer at least partial
specifications, but directly in CrySL, that security experts can then further correct and
complete by hand.
2.3 Detecting Misuses of Security APIs
Only few previous approaches specifically address the detection of misuses of security APIs.
CryptoLint [13] performs a lightweight syntactic analysis to detect violations of exactly six
hard-coded usage rules for the JCA in Android apps. Those six rules, while important to
obey for security, resemble only a tiny fraction of the rule set we provide in this work. It is
also hard to specify and validate new rules using CryptoLint, because they would have
to be hard-coded. Unlike CryptoLint, CrySL is designed to allow crypto experts to also
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1 SecretKeyGenerator kG = KeyGenerator . getInstance ("AES");
2 kG.init (128);
3 SecretKey cipherKey = kG. generateKey ();
4
5 String plaintextMSG = getMessage ();
6 Cipher ciph = Cipher . getInstance ("AES/GCM");
7 ciph.init( Cipher . ENCRYPT_MODE , cipherKey );
8 byte [] cipherText = ciph. doFinal ( plaintextMSG . getBytes ("UTF -8"));
Figure 1 An example illustrating the use of javax.crypto.KeyGenerator to implement data
encryption in Java.
express comprehensive and complex rules with ease. In Section 8, we extensively compare
our tool CogniCryptsast to CryptoLint.
Another tool that finds misuses of Crypto APIs is Crypto Misuse Analyzer (CMA) [35].
Similar to CryptoLint, CMA’s rules are hard-coded, and its static analysis is rather basic.
Many of CMA’s hard-coded rules are also contained in the CrySL rule set that we provide.
Unlike CogniCryptsast, CMA has been evaluated on a small dataset of only 45 apps.
Chatzikonstantinou et al. [12] manually identified misuses of Crypto APIs in 49 apps
and then verified their findings using a dynamic checker. All three studies concluded that at
least 88% of the studied apps misuse at least one Crypto API.
None of the previous approaches facilitates rule creation by means of a higher-level
specification language. Instead, the rules are hard-coded into each tool, making it hard
for non-experts in static analysis to extend or alter the rule set, and impossible to share
rules among tools. Moreover, such hard-coded rules are quite restricted, causing the tools to
have a very low recall (i.e., missing many actual API misuses). CrySL, on the other hand,
due to its Java-like syntax, enables cryptography experts to easily define new rules. The
CrySL compiler then automatically transforms those rules into appropriate, highly-precise
static-analysis checks. By defining crypto-usage rules in CrySL instead of hard-coding them,
one also makes those rules reusable in different contexts.
3 An Example of a Secure Usage of Crypto APIs
Throughout the paper, we will use the code example in Figure 1 to motivate the language
features in CrySL. The code in this figure constitutes an API usage that according to the
current state of cryptography research can be considered secure. Lines 1–3 generate a 128-bit
secret key to use with the encryption algorithm AES. Lines 5–7 use that key to initialize
a Java Cipher object that encrypts plaintextMSG. Since AES encrypts plaintext block by
block, it must be configured to use one of several modes of operation. The mode of operation
determines how to encrypt a block based on the encryption of the preceding block(s). Line 6
configures Cipher to use the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation [25].
Although the code example may look straightforward, a number of subtle alterations to the
code would render the encryption non-functional or even insecure. First, both KeyGenerator
and Cipher only support a limited choice of encryption algorithms. If the developer passes
an unsupported algorithm to either getInstance methods, the respective line will throw a
runtime exception. Similarly, the design of the APIs separates the classes for key generation
and encryption. Therefore, the developer needs to make sure they pass the same algorithm
(here "AES") to the getInstance methods of KeyGenerator and Cipher. If the developer
does not configure the algorithms as such, the generated key will not fit the encryption
algorithm, and the encryption will fail by throwing a runtime exception. None of the existing
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label : varname = METHOD A: B = C(D) – a single event with
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Figure 2 Basic CrySL syntax elements.
tools discussed in Section 2.3 are capable of detecting such functional misuses. Moreover,
some supported algorithms are no longer considered secure (e.g., DES or AES/ECB [15]). If
the developer selects such an algorithm, the program will still run to completion, but the
resulting encryption could easily be broken by attackers. To make things worse, the JCA, the
most popular API, offers the insecure ECB mode by default (i.e., when developers request
only "AES" without specifying a mode of operation explicitly).
To use Crypto APIs properly, developers generally have to take into consideration two
dimensions of correctness: (1) the functional correctness that allows the program to run and
terminate successfully and (2) the provided security guarantees. Prior empirical studies have
shown that developers, for instance by looking for code examples on web portals such as
StackOverflow [14], frequently succeed in obtaining functionally correct code. However, they
often fail to obtain a secure use of Crypto APIs, primarily because most code examples on
those web portals provide “solutions” that themselves are insecure [14].




OBJECT ; OBJECTS A ; B – a list of objects A and B
OBJECT ; A – a list of the single object A
OBJECT :=
TYPE varname A B – object B of Java type A
EVENTS
EVENTS :=
EVENT ; EVENTS A ; B – a list of events A and B
EVENT ; A – a list of the single event A
FORBIDDEN
FMETHODS :=
FMETHOD ; FMETHODS A ; B – a list of forbidden A and B
FMETHOD ; A – a list of the single forbidden method A
FMETHOD :=
methname(TYPES) => label A(B) => C – a forbidden method named A
with parameter of Type B and replacement C
ORDER
USAGEPATTERN :=
USAGEPATTERN , USAGEPATTERN A , B – A followed by B
USAGEPATTERN | USAGEPATTERN A | B – A or B
USAGEPATTERN ? A? – A is optional
USAGEPATTERN * A* – 0 or more As
USAGEPATTERN + A+ – 1 or more As





CONSTRAINT => CONSTRAINT A => B – A implies B
CONSTRAINT
CONSTRAINT :=










Figure 3 CrySL rule syntax in Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [6].
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4 CrySL Syntax
As we discuss in Section 2.2, mining API properties for Crypto APIs is extremely challenging,
if possible at all, due to the overwhelming number of misuses one finds in actual applications.
Hence, instead of relying on the security of existing usages and examples, we here follow an
approach in which cryptography experts define correct API usages manually in a special-
purpose language, CrySL. In this section, we give an overview of the CrySL syntax elements.
A formal treatment of the CrySL semantics is presented in Section 5. Figure 2 presents the
basic syntactic elements of CrySL, and Figure 3 presents the full syntax for CrySL rules.
Figure 4 shows an abbreviated CrySL rule for javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.
4.1 Design Decisions Behind CrySL
We designed CrySL specifically with crypto experts in mind, and in fact with the help of
crypto experts. This work was carried out in the context of a large collaborative research
center than involves more than a dozen research groups involved in cryptography research.
As a result of the domain research conducted within this center, we made the following design
decisions when designing CrySL.
White listing. During our domain analysis, we observed that, for the given Crypto APIs,
there are many ways they can be misused, but only a few that correspond to correct and
secure usages. To obtain concise usage specifications, we decided to design CrySL to use
white listing in most places (i.e., defining secure uses explicitly, while implicitly assuming
all deviations from this norm to be insecure).
Typestate and data flow. When reviewing potential misuses, we observed that many of
them are related to data flows and typestate properties [38]. Such misuses occur because
developers call the wrong methods on the API objects at hand, call them in an incorrect
order or miss to call the methods entirely. Data-flow properties are important when
reasoning about how certain data is being used (e.g., passwords, keys or seed material).
String and integer constraints. In the crypto domain, string and integer parameters are
ubiquitously used to select or parametrize specific cryptography algorithms. Strings
are widely used, because they are easily recognizable, configurable, and exchangeable.
However, specifying an incorrect string parameter may result in the selection of an insecure
algorithm or algorithm combination. Many APIs also use strings for user credentials.
Those credentials, passwords in particular, should not be hard-coded into the program’s
bytecode. A precise specification of correct crypto uses must therefore comprise constraints
over string and integer parameters.
Tool-independent semantics. We equipped CrySL with a tool-independent semantics (to
be presented in Section 5). In the future, those semantics will enable us and others to
build other or more effective tools for working with CrySL. For instance, in addition to
the static analysis the CrySL compiler derives from the semantics within this paper, we
are currently working on a dynamic checker to identify and mitigate CrySL violations at
runtime.
Our desire to allow crypto experts to easily express secure crypto uses also precludes us
from using existing generic definition languages such as Datalog. Such languages, or minor
extensions thereof, might have sufficient expressive power. However, following discussions
with crypto developers, we had to acknowledge that they are often unfamiliar with those
languages’ concepts. CrySL thus deliberately only includes concepts familiar to those
developers, hence supporting an easy understanding. We next explain the elements that a
typical CrySL rule comprises.
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4.2 Mandatory Sections in a CrySL Rule
To provide simple and reusable constructs, a CrySL rule is defined on the level of individual
classes. Therefore, the rule starts off by stating the class that it is defined for.
In Figure 4, the OBJECTS section defines three objects1 to be used in later sections of
the rule (e.g., the object algorithm of type String). These objects are typically used as
parameters or return values in the EVENTS section.
The EVENTS section defines all methods that may contribute to the successful use of a
KeyGenerator object, including two method event patterns (Lines 17–18). The first pattern
matches calls to getInstance(String algorithm), but the second pattern actually matches
calls to two overloaded getInstance methods:
getInstance(String algorithm, Provider provider)
getInstance(String algorithm, String provider)
The first parameter of all three methods is a String object whose value states the algorithm
that the key should be generated for. This parameter is represented by the previously defined
algorithm object. Two of the getInstance methods are overloaded with two parameters.
Since we do not need to specify the second parameter in either method, we substitute it with
an underscore that serves as a placeholder in one combined pattern definition (Line 18). This
concept of method event patterns is similar to pointcuts in aspect-oriented programming
languages such as AspectJ [19]. For CrySL, we resort to a more lightweight and restricted
syntax as we found full-fledged pointcuts to be unnecessarily complex. Subsequently, the
rule defines patterns for the various init methods that set the proper parameter values
(e.g., keysize) and a generateKey method that completes the key generation and returns the
generated key.
Line 30 defines a usage pattern for KeyGenerator using the keyword ORDER. The usage
pattern is a regular expression of method event patterns that are defined in EVENTS. Although
each method pattern defines a label to simplify referencing related events (e.g., g1, i2, and
GenKey), it is tedious and error-prone to require listing all those labels again in the ORDER
section. Therefore, CrySL allows defining aggregates. An aggregate represents a disjunction
of multiple patterns by means of their labels. Line 19 defines an aggregate GetInstance that
groups the two getInstance patterns. Using aggregates, the usage pattern for KeyGenerator
reads: there must be exactly one call to one of the getInstance methods, optionally followed
by a call to one of the init methods, and finally a call to generateKey.
Following the keyword CONSTRAINTS, Lines 33–35 define the constraints for objects
defined under OBJECTS and used as parameters or return values in the EVENTS section. In the
abbreviated CrySL rule in Figure 4, the first constraint limits the value of algorithm to
"AES" or "Blowfish". For each algorithm, there is one constraint that restricts the possible
values of keysize.
The ENSURES section is the final mandatory construct in a CrySL rule. It allows
CrySL to support rely/guarantee reasoning. The section specifies predicates to govern
interactions between different classes. For example, a Cipher object uses a key obtained
from a KeyGenerator. The ENSURES section specifies what a class guarantees, presuming
that the object is used properly. For example, the KeyGenerator CrySL rule in Figure 4
ends with the definition of a predicate generatedKey with the generated key object and its
corresponding algorithm as parameters. This predicate may be required (i.e., relied on) by
the rule for Cipher or other classes that make use of such a key through the optional element
of the REQUIRES block as illustrated in Figure 5.
1 As the example shows, in CrySL, OBJECTS also comprise primitive values.
ECOOP 2018
10:10 CrySL: An Approach to Validating the Correct Usage of Cryptographic APIs
9 SPEC javax. crypto . KeyGenerator
10
11 OBJECTS
12 java.lang. String algorithm ;
13 int keySize ;
14 javax. crypto . SecretKey key;
15
16 EVENTS
17 g1: getInstance ( algorithm );
18 g2: getInstance (algorithm , _);
19 GetInstance := g1 | g2;
20
21 i1: init( keySize );
22 i2: init(keySize , _);
23 i3: init(_);
24 i4: init(_, _);
25 Init := i1 | i2 | i3 | i4;
26
27 GenKey : key = generateKey ();
28
29 ORDER
30 GetInstance , Init?, GenKey
31
32 CONSTRAINTS
33 algorithm in {"AES", " Blowfish "};
34 algorithm in {"AES"} => keySize in {128 , 192, 256};




38 generatedKey [key , algorithm ];
Figure 4 CrySL rule for using javax.crypto.KeyGenerator.
To obtain the required expressiveness, we have further enriched CrySL with some
simple built-in auxiliary functions. For example, in Figure 5, the function alg extracts
the encryption algorithm from transformation (Line 55). This function is necessary,
because generatedKey expects only the encryption algorithm as its second parameter,
but transformation optionally specifies also the mode of operation and padding scheme
(e.g., Line 6 in Figure 1). For instance, alg would extract "AES" from "AES/GCM" or from
"AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding". Table Table 1 lists all of these functions. Note the last two
functions callTo and noCallTo may seem redundant to the ORDER and FORBIDDEN (see
Section 4.3) sections because they appear to fulfil the same purpose of requiring or forbidding
certain method calls. However, these two functions go beyond that because they allow for
the specification of conditional forbidden and required methods.
4.3 Optional Sections in a CrySL Rule
A CrySL rule may contain optional sections that we showcase through the CrySL rule
for PBEKeySpec. In Figure 6, the FORBIDDEN section specifies methods that must not be
called, because calling them is always insecure. PBEKeySpec derives cryptographic keys from
a user-given password. For security reasons, it is recommended to use a cryptographic salt
for this operation. However, the constructor PBEKeySpec(char[] password) does not allow
for a salt to be passed, and the implementation in the default provider does not generate
one. Therefore, this constructor should not be called, and any call to it should be flagged.
Consequently, the CrySL rule for PBEKeySpec lists it in the FORBIDDEN section (Line 72). In
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39 SPEC javax. crypto . Cipher
40
41 OBJECTS
42 int encmode ;
43 java. security .Key key;




48 g1: getInstance ( transformation );
49 ...





55 generatedKey [key , alg( transformation )];
56
57 ENSURES
58 encrypted [cipherText , plainText ];
Figure 5 CrySL rule for using javax.crypto.Cipher.







length(object) Retrieve length of object
nevertypeof(object, type) Forbid object to be of type
callTo(method) Require call to method
noCallTo(method) Forbid call to method
the case of PBEKeySpec, there is an alternative secure constructor (Line 68). CrySL allows
one to specify an alternative method event pattern using the arrow notation shown in Line 72.
With FORBIDDEN events, CrySL’s language design deviates a bit from its usual white-listing
approach. We made this choice deliberately to keep specifications concise. Without explicit
FORBIDDEN events, one would have to simulate their effect by explicitly listing all events
defined on a given type except the one that ought to be forbidden. This would significantly
increase the size of CrySL specifications.
In general, predicates are generated for a particular usage whenever it does not use any
FORBIDDEN events, its regular EVENTS follow the usage pattern defined in the ORDER section,
and if the usage fulfils all constraints in the CONSTRAINTS section of its corresponding rule.
PBEKeySpec, however, deviates from that standard. The class contains a constructor that
receives a user-given password, but the method clearPassword deletes that password later,
making it no longer accessible to other objects that might use the key-spec. Consequently, a
PBEKeySpec object fulfils its role after calling the constructor but only until clearPassword
is called.
To model this usage precisely, CrySL allows one to specify a method-event pattern using
the keyword after (Line 80). If the respective method is called, a predicate is generated.
Furthermore, CrySL supports invalidating an existing predicate in the NEGATES section
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59 SPEC javax. crypto .spec. PBEKeySpec
60
61 OBJECTS
62 char [] pw;
63 byte [] salt;
64 int it;
65 int keylength ;
66
67 EVENTS
68 create : PBEKeySpec (pw , salt , it , keylength );
69 clear: clearPassword ();
70
71 FORBIDDEN
72 PBEKeySpec (char []) => create ;
73 PBEKeySpec (char [], byte [], int) => create ;
74
75 ORDER




80 keyspec [this , keylength ] after create ;
81
82 NEGATES
83 keyspec [this , _];
Figure 6 CrySL rule for javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec.
(Line 83). The last call to be made on a PBEKeySpec object is the call to clearPassword
(Line 76). Additionally, the rule lists the predicate keySpec[this,_] within the NEGATES
block. Semantically, the negation of the predicates means the following. A final event in the
ORDER pattern, in this case a call to clearPassword, invalidates the previously generated
keyspec predicate(s) for this. Section 5.2.2 presents the formal semantics of predicates.
5 CrySL Formal Semantics
5.1 Basic Definitions
A CrySL rule consists of several sections. The OBJECTS section comprises a set of typed
variable declarations V. In the syntax in Figure 3, each declaration v ∈ V is represented by
the syntax element TYPE varname. M is the set of all resolved method signatures, where
each signature includes the method name and argument types. The EVENTS section contains
elements of the form (m, v), where m ∈ M and v ∈ V∗. We denote the set of all methods
referenced in EVENTS by M . The FORBIDDEN section lists a set of methods from M denoted
by their signatures; forbidden events cannot bind any variables. The ORDER section specifies
the usage pattern in terms of a regular expression of labels or aggregates that are in M ,
i.e., over the defined EVENTS. We express this regular expression formally by the equivalent
non-deterministic finite automaton (Q,M, δ, q0, F ) over the alphabet M , where Q is a set of
states, q0 is its initial state, F is the set of accepting states, and δ : Q×M → P(Q) is the
state transition function.
The CONSTRAINTS section is a subset of C := (V→ O ∪V)→ B (i.e., each constraint is a
boolean function), where the argument is itself a function that maps variable names in V to
objects in O or values with primitive types in V.
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A CrySL rule is a tuple (T,F ,A, C), where T is the reference type specified by the SPEC
keyword, F ⊆ M is the set of forbidden events, A = (Q,M, δ, q0, F ) ∈ A is the automaton
induced by the regular expression of the ORDER section, and C ⊆ C is the set of CONSTRAINTS
that the rule lists. We refer to the set of all CrySL rules as SPEC.
Our formal definition of a CrySL rule does not contain the sections REQUIRES, ENSURES,
and NEGATES. Those sections reason about the interaction of predicates, whose formal
treatment we discuss in Section 5.2.2.
5.2 Runtime Semantics
Each CrySL rule encodes usage constraints to be validated for all runtime objects of the
reference type T stated in its SPEC section. We define the semantics of a CrySL rule in
terms of an evaluation over a runtime program trace that records all relevant runtime objects
and values, as well as all events specified within the rule.
I Definition 1 (Event). Let O be the set of all runtime objects and V the set of all primitive-
typed runtime values. An event is a tuple (m, e) ∈ E of a method signature m ∈ M and
an environment e (i.e., a mapping V→ O ∪ V of the parameter variable names to concrete
runtime objects and values). If the environment e holds a concrete object for the this value,
then it is called the event’s base object.
I Definition 2 (Runtime Trace). A runtime trace τ ∈ E∗ is a finite sequence of events
τ0 . . . τn.
I Definition 3 (Object Trace). For any τ ∈ E∗, a subsequence τi1 ...τin is called an object
trace if i1 < ... < in and all base objects of τij are identical.
Lines 1–2 in Figure 1 result in an object trace that has two events:
(m0, {algorithm 7→ "AES", this 7→ okg})
(m1, {algorithm 7→ "AES", keySize 7→ 128, this 7→ okg})
where m0 and m1 are the signatures of the getInstance and init methods of the
KeyGenerator class. For static factory methods such as getInstance, we assume that
this is bound to the returned object. We use okg to denote that the object o is bound to
the variable kG at runtime.
The decision whether a runtime trace τ satisfies a set of CrySL rules involves two
steps. In the first step, individual object traces are evaluated independently of one another.
Yet, different runtime objects may still interact with each other. CrySL rules capture this
interaction by means of rely/guarantee reasoning, implemented through predicates that a
rule ensures on a runtime object. These interactions between different objects are checked
against the specification in a second step by considering the predicates they require and
ensure. We first discuss individual object traces in more detail.
5.2.1 Individual Object Traces
The sections FORBIDDEN, ORDER and CONSTRAINTS are evaluated on individual object traces.
Figure 7 defines the function sato that is true if and only if a given trace τo for a runtime
object o satisfies its CrySL rule. This definition of sato ignores interactions with other
object traces. We will discuss later how such interactions are resolved. In the following, we
assume the trace τo = τo0 , ..., τon, where τoi = (moi , eoi ). To illustrate the computation, we will
also refer to our example from Figure 1 and the involved rules of KeyGenerator (Figure 4)
and Cipher (Figure 5). The function sato is composed of three sub-functions:
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sato : E∗ × SPEC→ B
[τo, (T o,Fo,Ao, Co)]→ satoF (τo,Fo) ∧
satoA(τo,Ao) ∧
satoC(τo, Co)
Figure 7 The function sato verifies an individual object trace for the object o.
0start 1 2 3
GetInstance Init GenKey
GenKey
Figure 8 The state machine for the CrySL rule in Figure 4 (without an implicit error state).
5.2.1.1 Forbidden Events (satoF )






The CrySL rule for KeyGenerator does not list any forbidden methods. Hence, sato
trivially evaluates to true for object kG in Figure 1.
5.2.1.2 Order Errors (satoA)
The second function checks that the trace object is used in compliance with the specified
usage pattern (i.e., all methods in the rule are invoked in no other than the specified order).
Formally, the sequence of method signatures of the object trace mo := mo0, . . . ,mon (i.e., the
projection onto the method signatures) must be an element of the language L(Ao) that the
automaton Ao = (Q,M, δ, q0, F ) of the ORDER section induces. By definition of language
containment, after the last observed signature of the trace mon, the corresponding state of the
automaton must be an accepting state s ∈ F . This definition ignores any variable bindings.
They are evaluated in the second step.
satoA(τo,Ao) := mo ∈ L(Ao)
Figure 8 displays the automaton created for KeyGenerator using the aggregate names as
labels. State 0 is the initial state, and state 3 is the only accepting state. Following the code
in Figure 1 for the object kG of type KeyGenerator, the automaton transitions from state 0
to 1 at the call to getInstance (Line 1). With the calls to init (Line 2) and generateKey
(Line 3), the automaton first moves to state 2 and finally to state 3. Therefore, function
satoA evaluates to true for this example.
5.2.1.3 Constraints (satoC)
The validity check of the constraints ensures that all constraints of C are satisfied. This check
requires the sequence of environments (eo0, ..., eon) of the trace τo. All objects that are bound
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To compute satoC for the KeyGenerator object kG at the call to getInstance in Line 1,
only the first constraint has to be checked. This is because the corresponding environment eo1
holds a value only for algorithm, and the other two constraints reference other variable names.
The evaluation function c returns true if algorithm assumes either “AES” or “Blowfish”
as its value, which is the case in Figure 1. The computation of satoC for Lines 2–3 works
similarly.
5.2.2 Interaction of Object Traces
To define interactions between individual object traces, the REQUIRES, ENSURES, and NEGATES
sections allow individual CrySL rules to reference one another. For a rule for one object to
hold at any given point in an execution trace, all predicates that its REQUIRES section lists
must have been both previously ensured (by other specifications) and not negated. Predicates
are ensured (i.e., generated) and negated (i.e., killed) by certain events. Formally, a predicate
is an element of P := {(name, args) | args ∈ V∗} (i.e., a pair of a predicate name and a
sequence of variable names). Predicates are generated in specific states. Each CrySL rule
induces a function G : S → P(P) that maps each state of its automaton to the predicate(s)
that the state generates.
The predicates listed in the ENSURES and NEGATES sections may be followed by the term
after n, where n is a method event pattern label or aggregate. The states that follow the
event or aggregate n in the automaton generate the respective predicate. If the term after is
not used for a predicate, the final states of the automaton generate (or negate) that predicate
(i.e., we interpret it as after n, where n is an event that leads to a final state).
In addition to states selected as predicate-generating, the predicate is also ensured if the
object resides in any state that transitively follows the selected state, unless the states are
explicitly (de-)selected for the same predicate within the NEGATES section. At any state that
generates a predicate, the event driving the automaton into this state binds the variable
names to the values that the specification previously collected along its object trace.
Formally, an event no = (mo, eo) ∈ E of a rule r and for an object o ensures a predicate
p = (predName, args) ∈ P on the objects eo ∈ O if:
1. The method mo of the event leads to a state s of the automaton that generates the
predicate p (i.e., p ∈ G(s)).
2. The runtime trace of the event’s base object o satisfies the function sato.
3. All relevant REQUIRES predicates of the rule are satisfied at execution of event no.
For the KeyGeneraor object kG in Figure 1, a predicate is generated at Line 7 because
(1) its automaton transitions to its only predicate-generating state (state 3 of the automaton
in Figure 8), (2) sato evaluates to true as previously shown for each subfunction and (3) the
corresponding CrySL rule does not require any predicates.
6 Detecting Misuses of Crypto APIs
To detect all possible rule violations, our tool CogniCryptsast approximates the evaluation
function sato using a static data-flow analysis. In a security context, it is a requirement to
detect as many misuses as possible. One drawback is the potential for false warnings that
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84 boolean option1 = isPrime (66); // some non - trivial predicate returning
false
85 byte [] input = " Message ". getBytes ("UTF -8");
86
87 String alg = "SHA -256";
88 if ( option1 ) alg = "MD5";
89 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest . getInstance (alg);
90
91 if (input.size () > 0) md. update (input);
92 byte [] digest = md. digest ();
Figure 9 An example illustrating the usage of java.security.MessageDigest in Java.
originate from over-approximations any static analysis requires. In the following, we use the
example in Figure 9 to illustrate why and where approximations are required. We will show
later in our evaluation that, in practice, our analysis is highly precise and that the chosen
approximations rarely actually lead to false warnings.
The code example in Figure 9 implements a hashing operation. By default, the code
uses SHA-256. However, if the condition option1 evaluates to true, MD5 is chosen instead
(Line 88). The CrySL rule for MessageDigest, displayed in Figure 10, does not allow the
usage of MD5 though, because it is no longer secure [15].
The update operation is performed only on non-empty input (Line 91). Otherwise, the call
to update is skipped and only the call to digest is executed, without any input. Although
not strictly insecure, this usage does not comply with the CrySL rule for MessageDigest,
because it leads to no content being hashed.
To approximate satoF , the analysis must search for possible forbidden events by first
constructing a call graph for the whole program under analysis. It then iterates through the
graph to find calls to forbidden methods. Depending on the precision of the call graph, the
analysis may find calls to forbidden methods that cannot be reached at runtime.
The analysis represents each runtime object o by its allocation site. In our example,
allocation sites are new expressions and calls to getInstance that return an object of a type
for which a CrySL rule exists. For each such allocation site, the analysis approximates satoA
by first creating a finite-state machine. CogniCryptsast then evaluates the state machine
using a typestate analysis that abstracts runtime traces by program paths. The typestate
analysis is path-insensitive, thus, at branch points, it assumes that both sides of the branch
may execute. In our contrived example, this feature leads to a false positive: although
the condition in Line 91 always evaluates to true, and the call to update is never actually
skipped, the analysis considers that this may happen, and thus reports a rule violation.
To approximate satoC, we have extended the typestate analysis to also collect potential
runtime values of variables along all program paths where an allocated object is used. The
constraint solver first filters out all irrelevant constraints. A constraint is irrelevant if it
refers to one or more variables that the typestate analysis has not encountered. In Figure 10,
the rule only includes one internal constraint – on variable algorithm. If we add a new
internal constraint to the rule about the variable offset, the constraint solver will filter it
out as irrelevant when analyzing the code in Figure 9 because the only method this variable
is associated with (digest labelled d3) is never called. The analysis distinguishes between
never encountering a variable in the source code and not being able to extract the values of
a variable. With the same rule and code snippet, if the analysis fails to extract the value for
algorithm, the constraint evaluates to false. Collecting potential values of a variable over all
possible program paths of an allocation site may lead to further imprecision. In our example,
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93 SPEC java. security . MessageDigest
94
95 OBJECTS
96 java.lang. String algorithm ;
97 byte [] input;
98 int offset ;
99 int length ;




104 g1: getInstance ( algorithm );
105 g2: getInstance (algorithm , _);
106 Gets := g1 | g2;
107 ...
108 Updates := ...;
109
110 d1: output = digest ();
111 d2: output = digest (input);
112 d3: digest (hash , offset , length );
113 Digests := d1 | d2 | d3;
114
115 r: reset ();
116
117 ORDER
118 Gets , (d2 | ( Updates +, Digests )), (r, (d2 | ( Updates +, Digests )))*
119
120 CONSTRAINTS
121 algorithm in {"SHA -256", "SHA -384", "SHA -512"};
122
123 ENSURES
124 digested [hash , ...];
125 digested [hash , input ];
Figure 10 CrySL rule for java.security.MessageDigest.
the analysis cannot statically rule out that algorithm may be MD5. The rule forbids the
usage of MD5. Therefore, the analysis reports a misuse.
Handling predicates in our analysis follows the formal description very closely. If sato
evaluates to true for a given allocation site, the analysis checks whether all required predicates
for the allocation site have been ensured earlier in the program. In the trivial case, when no
predicate is required, the analysis immediately ensures the predicate defined in the ENSURES
section. The analysis constantly maintains a list of all ensured predicates, including the
statements in the program that a given predicate can be ensured for. If the allocation site
under analysis requires predicates from other allocation sites, the analysis consults the list of
ensured predicates and checks whether the required predicate, with matching names and
arguments, exists at the given statement. If the analysis finds all required predicates, it
ensures the predicate(s) specified in the ENSURES section of the rule.
7 Implementation
We have implemented the CrySL compiler using Xtext [17], an open-source framework for
developing domain-specific languages as well as the CrySL- parameterizable static analysis
CogniCryptsast. We have further integrated CogniCryptsast with CogniCrypt [20], in
which it replaces the original code-analysis component.
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7.1 CrySL
Given the CrySL grammar, Xtext provides a parser, type checker, and syntax highlighter for
the language. When supplied with a type-safe CrySL rule, Xtext outputs the corresponding
AST, which is then used to generate the required static analysis.
We developed CrySL rules for all relevant JCA classes in an iterative process. That is,
we first worked through the JCA documentation to produce a set of rules and then refined
these rules through selective discussions with cryptographers and searching security blogs and
forums. In total, we have devised 23 rules covering classes ranging from key handling to digital
signing. All rules define a usage pattern. Some classes (e.g. IvParameterSpec) contain one
call to a constructor only, while others (e.g. Cipher) involve almost ten elements with several
layers of nesting. Fifteen rules come with parameter constraints, eight of which contain
limitations on cryptographic algorithms. The eight rules without parameter constraints
are mostly related to classes whose purpose is to set up parameters for specific encryptions
(e.g. GCMParameterSpec). All rules define at least one ENSURES predicate, while only eleven
require predicates from other rules. Across all rules, we have only declared two methods
forbidden. We do not find this low number surprising as such methods are always insecure
and should not at all be part of a security API. If at all, two forbidden methods is too high a
number. All rules are available at https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/Crypto-API-Rules.
7.2 CogniCryptsast
CogniCryptsast consists of several extensions to the program analysis framework Soot [39,
21]. Soot transforms a given Java program into an intermediate representation that facilitates
executing intra- and inter-procedural static analyses. The framework provides standard static
analyses such as call-graph construction. Additionally, Soot can analyze a given Android
app intra-procedurally. Further extensions by FlowDroid [5] enable the construction of
Android-specific call graphs that are necessary to perform inter-procedural analysis.
Validating the ORDER section in a CrySL rule requires solving the typestate check satoA.
To this end, we use IDEal, a framework for efficient inter-procedural data-flow analysis [36],
to instantiate a typestate analysis. The analysis defines the finite-state machine Ao to check
against and the allocation sites to start the analysis from. From those allocation sites, IDEal
performs a flow-, field-, and context-sensitive typestate analysis.
The constraints and the predicates require knowledge about objects and values associated
with rule variables at given execution points in the program. The typestate analysis in
CogniCryptsast extracts the primitive values and objects on-the-fly, where the latter are
abstracted by allocation sites. When the typestate analysis encounters a call site that is
referred to in an event definition, and the respective rule requires the object or value of an
argument to the call, CogniCryptsast triggers an on-the-fly backward analysis to extract the
objects or values that may participate in the call. This on-the-fly analysis yields comparatively
high performance and scalability, because many of the arguments of interest are values of type
String and Integer. Thus, using an on-demand computation avoids constant propagation
of all strings and integers through the program. For the on-the-fly backward analysis, we
extended the on-demand pointer analysis Boomerang [37] to propagate both allocation sites
and primitive values. Once the typestate analysis is completed, and all required queries to
Boomerang are computed, CogniCryptsast solves the internal constraints and predicates
using our own custom-made solvers.
CogniCryptsast may be operated as a standalone command line tool. This way, it
takes a program as input and produces an error report detailing misuses and their locations.
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However, we have further integrated CogniCryptsast into CogniCrypt [20]. CogniCrypt
is a Eclipse plugin, which supports developers in using Crypto APIs by means of scenario-
based code generation as well code analysis for Crypto APIs. In this context, CogniCrypt
translates misuses found by CogniCryptsast into standard Eclipse error markers.
8 Evaluation
We evaluate our implementation CogniCryptsast using the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the precision and recall of CogniCryptsast?
RQ1: What types of misuses does CogniCryptsast find?
RQ1: How fast does CogniCryptsast run?
RQ1: How does CogniCryptsast compare to the state of the art?
To answer these questions, we applied the generated static analysis CogniCryptsast
to 10,000 Android apps from the AndroZoo dataset [4] using our full CrySL rule set
for the JCA. We ran our experiments on a Debian virtual machine with sixteen cores
and 64 GB RAM. We chose apps that are available in the official Google Play Store
and received an update in 2017. This ensures that we report on the most up-to-date
usages of Crypto APIs. We make available all artefacts at this Github repository: https:
//github.com/CROSSINGTUD/paper-crysl-reproduciblity-artefacts.
8.1 Precision and Recall (RQ1)
Setup
To compute precision and recall, the first two authors manually checked 50 randomly selected
apps from our dataset for typestate errors and violations of internal constraints. To collect
this random sample, we implemented a Java program that generates random numbers
using SecureRandom and retrieved the apps from the corresponding lines in the spreadsheet
containing the results of analysing the 10,000 apps. We did not check for unsatisfied predicates
or forbidden events, because these are hard to detect manually – while it may seem simple
to check for calls to forbidden events, it is non-trivial to determine whether or not such
calls reside in dead code. We compare the results of our manual analysis to those reported
by CogniCryptsast. The goal of this evaluation is to compute precision and recall of the
analysis implementation in CogniCryptsast, not the quality of our CrySL rules. We discuss
the latter in Section 8.4. Consequently, we define a false positive to be a warning that should
not be reported according to the specified rule, irrespective of that rule’s semantic correctness.
Similarly, a false negative would arise if CogniCryptsast missed to report a misuse that,
according to the CrySL rule, does exist in the analyzed program.
Results
In the 50 apps we inspected, CogniCryptsast detects 228 usages of JCA classes. Table 2
lists the misuses that CogniCryptsast finds (156 misuses in total). In particular, Cog-
niCryptsast issues 27 typestate-related warnings, with only 2 false positives. Both arise
because the analysis is path-insensitive (Section 6). We further found 4 false negatives that
are caused by initializing a MessageDigest or a MAC object without completing the operation.
CogniCryptsast fails to find these typestate errors because the supporting off-the-shelf alias
analysis Boomerang times out, causing CogniCryptsast to abort the typestate analysis
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Table 2 Correctness of CogniCryptsast warnings.
Total Warnings False Positives False Negatives
Typestate 27 2 4
Constraints 129 19 0
Total 156 21 4
without reporting a warning for the object at hand. A larger timeout or future improvements
to the alias analysis Boomerang would avoid this problem.
The automated analysis finds 129 constraint violations. We were able to confirm 110
of them. In the other 19 cases, highly obfuscated code causes the analysis to fail to
extract possible runtime values statically. For such values, the constraint solver reports
the corresponding constraint as violated. A better handling of such highly obfuscated code
can be enabled by techniques complementary to ours. For instance, one could augment
CogniCryptsast with the hybrid static/dynamic analysis Harvester [32]. We have also
checked the apps for missed constraint violations (false negatives), but were unable to find
any.
RQ1: In our manual assessment, the typestate analysis achieves high precision (92.6%)
and recall (86.2%). The constraint resolution has a precision of 85.3% and a recall of 100%.
8.2 Types of Misuses (RQ2)
Setup
We report findings obtained by analyzing all our 10,000 Android apps from AndroZoo [4].
We then use the results of our manual analysis (Section 8.1) as a baseline to evaluate our
findings on a large scale.
CogniCryptsast detects the usage of at least one JCA class in 8,422 apps. Further
investigation unveiled that many of these usages originate from the same common libraries
included in the applications. To avoid counting the same crypto usages twice, and to
prevent over-counting, we exclude usages within packages com.android, com.facebook.ads,
com.google or com.unity3d from the analysis.
Results
Excluding the findings in common libraries, CogniCryptsast detects the usage of at least
one JCA class in 4,349 apps (43% of the analyzed apps). Most of these apps (95%) contain at
least one misuse. Across all apps, CogniCryptsast started its analysis for a total of 40,295
allocation sites (i.e., abstract objects). Of these, a total of 20,426 individual object traces
violate at least one part of the specified rule patterns. CogniCryptsast reports typestate
errors (ORDER section in the rule) for 4,708 objects, and reports a total of 4,443 objects to
have unsatisfied predicates (i.e., the object expected a predicate from another object as listed
in the REQUIRES block of a rule). The analysis also discovered 97 reachable call sites that call
forbidden events. The majority of object traces that violate at least one part of a CrySL
rule (54.7%) contradict a constraint listed in the CONSTRAINTS section of a rule.
Approximately 86% of these constraint-violations are related to MessageDigest. In
our manual analysis (see RQ1), 89 of the 110 found constraint violations originated from
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usages of MD5 and SHA-1. We expect a similar fraction to also hold for the 11,178 constraint
contradictions reported over all 10,000 apps. Many developers still use MD5 and SHA-1,
although both are no longer recommended by security experts [15]. CogniCryptsast
identifies 1,228 (10.9%) constraint violations related to Cipher usages. In our manual
analysis, all misuses of the Cipher class are due to using the insecure algorithm DES or the
ECB mode of operation. This result is in line with the findings of prior studies [13, 35, 12].
More than 75% of the typestate errors that CogniCryptsast issues are caused by
misuses of MessageDigest. Our manual analysis attributes this high number to incorrect
usages of the method reset(). In addition to misusing MessageDigest, misuses of Cipher
contribute 766 typestate errors. Finally, CogniCryptsast detects 157 typestate errors
related to PBEKeySpec. The ORDER section of the CrySL rule for PBEKeySpec requires
calling clearPassword() at the end of the lifetime of a PBEKeySpec object. We manually
inspected 3 of the misuses and observed that the call to clearPassword() is missing in all
of them.
Predicates are unsatisfied when CogniCryptsast expects the interaction of multiple
object traces but is not able to prove their correct interaction. With 4,443 unsatisfied
predicates reported, the number may seem relatively large, yet one must keep in mind that
unsatisfied predicates accumulate transitively. For example, if CogniCryptsast cannot
ensure a predicate for a usage of IVParameterSpec, it will not generate a predicate for the
key object that KeyGenerator generates using the IVParameterSpec object. Transitively,
CogniCryptsast reports an unsatisfied predicate also for any Cipher object that relies on
the generated key object.
CogniCryptsast also found 97 calls to forbidden methods. Since only two JCA classes
require the definition of forbidden methods in our CrySL rule set (PBEKeySpec and Cipher),
we do not find this low number surprising. A manual analysis of a handful of reports suggests
that most of the reported forbidden methods originate from calling the insecure PBEKeySpec
constructors, as we explained in Section 4.
From the 4,349 apps that use at least one JCA Crypto API, 2,896 apps (66.6%) contain
at least one typestate error, 1,367 apps (31.4%) lack required predicates, 62 apps (1.4%) call
at least one forbidden method, and 3,955 apps (90.9%) violate at least one internal constraint.
Ignoring the class MessageDigest, and hereby excluding MD5 and SHA-1 constraints, 874
apps still violate at least one constraint in other classes.
RQ2: Approximately 95% of apps misuse at least one Crypto API. Violating the constraints
of MessageDigest is the most common type of misuse.
8.3 Performance (RQ3)
Setup
CogniCryptsast comprises four main phases. It constructs (1) a call graph using Flow-
Droid [5] and then runs the actual analysis (Section 6), which (2) calls the typestate analysis
and (3) constraint analysis as required, attempting to (4) resolve all declared predicates.
During the analysis of our dataset, we measured the execution time that CogniCryptsast
spent in each phase. We ran CogniCryptsast once per application and capped the time of
each run to 30 minutes.
In Section 8.2, we report that CogniCryptsast found usages of the JCA in 4,349 of
all 10,000 apps in our dataset. If we include in the reporting those usages that arise from
misuses within the common libraries previously excluded (see Section 8.2), this number rises
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Figure 11 Analysis time (in log scale) of the individual phases of CogniCryptsast when running
on the apps that use the JCA.
to 8,422. We include the analysis of the libraries in this part of the evaluation because it helps
evaluate the general performance of the analysis in the worst case when whole applications
are analyzed.
Results
Figure 11 summarizes the distribution of analysis times for the four phases and the total
analysis time across these 8,422 apps. For each phase, the box plot highlights the median,
the 25% and 75% quartiles, and the minimal and maximal values of the distribution.
Across the apps in our dataset, there is a large variation in the reported execution time
(10 seconds to 28.6 minutes). We attribute this variation to the following reasons. The
analyzed apps have varying sizes – the number of reachable methods in the call graph varies
between 116 and 16,219 (median: 3,125 methods). The majority of the total analysis time
(83%) is spent on call-graph construction. For the remaining three phases of the analysis,
the distribution is as follows. Across all apps, the resolution of all declared predicates takes
approximately a median of 50 milliseconds, and the typestate analysis phase takes a median
of 500 milliseconds. The median for the constraint phase is 350 milliseconds. Therefore, the
major bottleneck for the analysis is call-graph construction, a problem orthogonal to the one
we address in this work. Our analysis itself is efficient and the overall analysis time is clearly
dominated by the runtime of the call-graph construction.
RQ3: On average, CogniCryptsast analyzes an app in 101 seconds, with call-graph
construction taking most of the time (83%).
8.4 Comparison to Existing Tools (RQ4)
Setup
We compare CogniCryptsast to CryptoLint [13], as we explained in Section 2.3 the most
closely related tool. Unfortunately, despite contacting the authors we were unable to obtain
access to CryptoLint’s implementation. We thus resorted to reimplementing the original
rules that are hard-coded in CryptoLint as CrySL rules. The fact that all CryptoLint
rules can be modelled in CrySL shows its superior expressiveness.
In this section, Rulesetfull denotes CogniCrypt’s comprehensive CrySL rules that we
have created for all the JCA classes, while Rulesetcl denotes the set of CrySL rules that we
developed to model the original CryptoLint rules. Additionally, CogniCryptsast denotes
our analysis when it runs using Rulesetfull, and CogniCryptcl denotes the analysis when
it runs using Rulesetcl.
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Rulesetfull consists of 23 rules, one for each class of the JCA. Rulesetcl comprises only
six individual rules, and they only use the sections ENSURES, REQUIRES and CONSTRAINTS. In
other words, the original hard-coded CryptoLint rules do not comprise typestate properties
nor forbidden methods. For three out of six rules, we managed to exactly capture the
semantics of the hard-coded CryptoLint rule in a respective CrySL rule. The remaining
three rules (3, 4, and 6 of the original CryptoLint rules) cannot be perfectly expressed as
a CrySL rule, and our CrySL-based rules over-approximate them instead.
CryptoLint rule 4, for instance, requires salts in PBEKeySpec to be non-constant. In
CrySL, such a relationship is expressed through predicates. Predicates in CrySL, however,
follow a white-listing approach and therefore only model correct behaviour. Therefore, in
CrySL we model the CryptoLint rule for PBEKeySpec in a stricter manner, requiring the
salt to be not just non-constant but truly random, i.e., returned from a proper random
generator. We followed a similar approach with the other two CryptoLint rules that
we modelled in CrySL. In result, Rulesetcl is stricter than the original implementation
of CryptoLint. In the comparison of CogniCryptsast and CogniCryptcl in terms of
their findings, the stricter rules produce more warnings than the original implementation of
CryptoLint. In our comparison against CogniCryptsast, this setup favours CryptoLint
because we assume that these additional findings to be true positives. Both rule sets are
available at https://github.com/CROSSINGTUD/Crypto-API-Rules.
Results
CogniCryptcl detects usages of JCA classes in 1,866 Android apps. For these apps, Cog-
niCryptcl reports 5,507 misuses, only a third of the 20,426 misuses that CogniCryptsast
identifies using Rulesetfull, our more comprehensive rule set.
Using CogniCryptcl, all reported warnings are related to 6 classes, compared to 23
classes that are specified in Rulesetfull. As we have pointed out, CryptoLint does not
specify any typestate properties or forbidden methods. Hence, CogniCryptcl does not find
the 4,805 warnings that CogniCryptsast identifies in these categories using Rulesetfull.
Furthermore, while CogniCryptsast reports 11,178 constraint violations with the standard
rules, CogniCryptcl reports only 1,177 constraint violations. Of the 11,178 constraint
violations, 9,958 are due to the rule specification for the class MessageDigest. CryptoLint
does not model this class. If we remove these violations, 1,609 violations are still reported by
CogniCryptsast, a total of 432 more than by CogniCryptcl.
We compare our findings to the study by Egele et al. [13] that identifies the use of ECB
mode as a common misuse of cryptography. In that study, 7,656 apps use ECB (65.2% of apps
that use Crypto APIs). On the other hand, in our study, CogniCryptcl identified 663 uses
of ECB mode in 35.5% of apps that use Crypto APIs. Although a high number of apps still
exhibit this basic misuse, there is a considerable decrease (from 65.2% to 35.5%) compared to
the previous study by Egele et al. [13]. Given that all apps in our study must have received
an update in 2017, we believe that the decrease of misuses reflects taking software security
more seriously in today’s app development.
Based on the high precision (92.6%) and recall (96.2%) values discussed in RQ1, we argue
that CogniCryptsast provides an analysis with a much higher recall than CryptoLint.
Although the larger and more comprehensive rule set, Rulesetfull, detects more complex
misuses, the precise analysis keeps the false-positive rate at a low percentage.
RQ4: The more comprehensive Rulesetfull detects 3× as many misuses as CryptoLint
in almost 4× more JCA classes.
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8.5 Threats to Validity
Our ruleset Rulesetfull is mainly based on the documentation of the JCA [18]. Although
we have significant domain expertise, our CrySL-rule specifications for the JCA are only
as correct as the JCA documentation. Our static-analysis toolchain depends on multiple
external components and despite an extensive set of test cases, of course, we cannot fully
rule out bugs in the implementation.
Java allows a developer to programmatically select a non-default cryptographic service
provider. CogniCryptsast currently does not detect such customizations but instead assumes
that the default provider is used. This behaviour may lead to imprecise results because our
rules forbid certain default values that are insecure for the default provider, but may be
secure if a different one is chosen.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we present CrySL, a description language for correct usages of cryptographic
APIs. Each CrySL rule is specific to one class, and it may include usage pattern definitions
and constraints on parameters. Predicates model the interactions between classes. For
example, a rule may generate a predicate on an object if it is used successfully, and another
rule may require that predicate from an object it uses. We also present a compiler for
CrySL that transforms a provided ruleset into an efficient and precise data-flow analysis
CogniCryptsast checking for compliance according to the rules. For ease of use, we have
integrated CogniCryptsast and with Eclipse crypto assistant CogniCrypt. Applying
CogniCryptsast, the analysis for our extensive ruleset Rulesetfull, to 10,000 Android apps,
we found 20,426 misuses spread over 95% of the 4,349 apps using the JCA. CogniCryptsast
is also highly efficient: for more than 75% of the apps the analysis finishes in under 3 minutes,
where most of the time is spent in Android-specific call graph construction.
In future work, we plan to address the following challenges. We have developed all the
rules used in CogniCryptsast ourselves. While we have acquired some deeper familiarity
with cryptographic concepts in general and the JCA in particular, we are not cryptographers.
Therefore, we are open to and want cryptography experts to correct potential mistakes
in our existing rules. We would further encourage domain experts to model their own
cryptographic libraries in CrySL to improve the support in CogniCryptsast and, by
extension, CogniCrypt. CrySL currently only supports a binary understanding of security
– a usage is either secure or not. We would like to enhance CrySL to have a more fine-
grained notion of security to allow for more nuanced warnings in CogniCryptsast. This
is challenging because the CrySL language still ought to be concise. Additionally, CrySL
currently requires one rule per class per JCA provider, because there is no way to express the
commonality and variability between different providers implementing the same algorithms,
leading to specification overhead. To address this issue, we plan to modularize the language
using import and override mechanisms. Moreover, we plan to extend CrySL to support
more complex properties such as using the same cryptographic key for multiple purposes.
We will also perform consistency checks for the CrySL rules. For now, only Xtext-based
type checks are performed.
Lastly, we also intend on applying CrySL in other contexts. One of the authors of this
paper has already started to have students implement a dynamic checker to identify and
mitigate violations at runtime. While the JCA is indeed the most commonly used Crypto
library, other Crypto libraries such as BouncyCastle [29] are being used as well and we will
to extend CogniCryptsast to support them. Additionally, we will investigate to which
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extent CrySL is applicable to Crypto APIs in other programming languages. At the time
of writing, we are exploring CrySL’s compatibility with OpenSSL [30]. We finally aim to
examine whether CrySL is expressive enough to meaningfully specify usage constraints for
non-crypto APIs.
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